Zambia’s Cabinet Approves Two New Fuel Pipelines From Tanzania and Namibia

LUSAKA — Zambia’s Cabinet approved two major cross-border pipeline projects on 19 February 2026, moving to give the landlocked country simultaneous fuel access from both the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic, a strategy the government has been actively pursuing since at least 2001, when an earlier version of a second Dar es Salaam pipeline first appeared in World Bank project documentation. What Did Zambia’s Cabinet Actually Approve? Chief Government Spokesperson Cornelius Mweetwa announced that Cabinet, meeting at State House, approved construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Multi-Products Pipeline (TZMPP) and the Namibia-Zambia Refined Petroleum and Natural Gas Pipeline (NZPGP), both structured as public-private partnerships. Mweetwa said the projects were intended to diversify Zambia’s fuel supply sources, strengthen the national petroleum distribution system, meet rising demand, reduce costs and stabilise petroleum prices, with national fuel consumption projected to reach approximately 3.7 million tonnes annually by 2030. How Does the New Tanzania Pipeline Relate to the Existing TAZAMA System? The TZMPP is intended to complement, not replace, the existing TAZAMA pipeline, which has connected Dar es Salaam to Ndola since 1968 and remains jointly owned by the Zambian government (66.7%) and the Tanzanian government (33.3%). TAZAMA was originally designed for crude oil transport, converted to carry finished petroleum products in 2023, and currently has an installed capacity of about 1.1 million tonnes annually against reported throughput of roughly 800,000 tonnes, considerably below Zambia’s projected future requirement. The existing pipeline runs through a physical network including a Dar es Salaam tank farm with six storage tanks, three totalling 36,000 cubic metres and three totalling 41,000 cubic metres, and seven pump stations spread across both countries, five in Tanzania, two in Zambia. Earlier feasibility work placed the new pipeline’s cost between $1 billion and $2 billion, though more recent 2026 reporting has consistently converged around $2 billion, based on 2023 feasibility studies. Notably, a version of this exact idea isn’t new: Wikipedia’s TAZAMA entry cites a 2001 World Bank Africa Region paper referencing a proposed 1,349-kilometre refined petroleum products pipeline estimated at $1.5 billion, meaning Zambia and Tanzania have been discussing some form of this second pipeline for roughly a quarter-century before Cabinet finally approved a version of it in 2026. What Would the New Pipeline Actually Carry That TAZAMA Doesn’t? Unlike TAZAMA, now used primarily to transport diesel and low-sulphur gas oil, the proposed TZMPP is designed as a multi-products system carrying petrol, jet fuel and kerosene alongside diesel. That matters because Zambia currently imports petrol, kerosene and Jet A1 by road specifically because the existing pipeline arrangement has been limited to diesel; when the open access system launched on TAZAMA in 2025, Zambia’s Ministry of Energy explicitly noted these other fuels would continue arriving by road under the current infrastructure. Industry reports put the new pipeline’s planned capacity at approximately 7 million tonnes annually, though Zambia’s official Cabinet announcement confirms the project’s purpose without specifying a final capacity figure, meaning that number should be treated as a reported planning estimate rather than a confirmed final specification. If accurate, that capacity would sit well above Zambia’s own projected 3.7 million tonne 2030 requirement, raising the genuine possibility that the pipeline is being sized partly to support regional distribution beyond Zambia’s domestic market alone. Why Is Zambia Also Building an Entirely Separate Pipeline From Namibia? The Tanzania project represents only half of Zambia’s new fuel strategy. The NZPGP would connect Namibia’s Atlantic port of Walvis Bay to Lusaka, carrying refined petroleum products alongside up to 350 million cubic feet of natural gas daily, with that gas component specifically earmarked for gas-to-power applications supporting Zambia’s energy-intensive copper mining industry. The timing isn’t coincidental: Namibia is approaching its own “first oil” phase, with TotalEnergies targeting a final investment decision on its Venus field by mid-2026 and first production projected for 2029-2030, while Galp’s Mopane field, holding estimated recoverable reserves of up to 1.1 billion barrels, began a three-well appraisal campaign in 2026. Zambia’s Namibia pipeline is, in effect, positioning the country to plug directly into an oil and gas boom just now beginning next door, rather than waiting years after Namibian production is already flowing to build the connecting infrastructure. The strategic logic underlying both pipelines simultaneously is straightforward diversification: rather than depending heavily on a single coastal supply corridor, Zambia would gain access to fuel arriving from opposite sides of the continent, creating flexibility when international prices shift, when logistics face disruption, or when one corridor experiences operational problems, a form of redundancy with real economic value for a landlocked economy whose transport, mining and agricultural sectors depend directly on reliable petroleum supply. Has Zambia Already Proven This Kind of Reform Actually Works? Yes, and this is arguably the strongest evidence supporting the broader pipeline strategy. In April 2025, Zambia introduced an open access framework on the existing TAZAMA pipeline, allowing multiple oil marketing companies to compete for transportation capacity rather than operating under the prior, more restrictive arrangement. The results are measurable from two distinct angles worth separating clearly. The IMF found that TAZAMA transportation premiums fell by approximately $59 per tonne after the reform, more than 50%, generating estimated savings of roughly $6.7 million monthly. Separately, Zambian officials and multiple energy trade publications report the reform contributed to an approximately 33% reduction in retail diesel pump prices, with the Ministry of Energy citing a fall from K32.54 per litre in March 2025 to K28.11 per litre by July 2026. Those two figures measure different things, the wholesale transportation premium versus the final retail price, but together they provide Zambia’s government with genuine, already-realised evidence that opening pipeline access to competition delivers real consumer savings, a track record that plausibly strengthened the case for committing to two considerably larger and more expensive pipeline projects. Has Construction Actually Started on Either New Pipeline? No. Despite Cabinet approval, the project remains in an earlier phase than construction. As of 14 September 2026, Zambia’s Ministry of Energy published a request for proposals for a transaction adviser to work with the governments of Tanzania and Zambia and TAZAMA Pipelines Limited, an assignment covering both construction of the new multi-products pipeline and rehabilitation of the existing one. That means the governments have approved the project concept and its PPP framework, but major steps remain, including transaction structuring, detailed technical work, financing arrangements, investor selection and final investment decisions, before physical construction can realistically begin. What Is Tanzania Doing on Its Side of This Corridor? Tanzania’s own infrastructure investment in the same broad energy corridor reinforces why Dar es Salaam’s position matters here. Tanzania broke ground in March 2026 on a $273 million fuel storage expansion at Dar es Salaam port, adding 36% more oil receiving capacity and cutting vessel waiting times from 22 days down to seven, a direct efficiency improvement for exactly the kind of petroleum throughput a new multi-products pipeline would depend on. That sits alongside Tanzania’s East African Crude Oil Pipeline, which had reached 79% completion by December 2025, and the country’s planned $42 billion LNG project, backed by an estimated 57 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. None of these projects are directly part of the Zambia pipeline deal, but together they show Tanzania actively building out Dar es Salaam’s capacity as a regional energy logistics hub at the same time Zambia is planning to route considerably more fuel volume through that same port. What Does This Mean for Dar es Salaam’s Strategic Position? The proposed pipeline would strengthen Dar es Salaam’s role as a fuel gateway for inland Africa considerably beyond its existing function. A much larger multi-products pipeline could increase both the volume and variety of petroleum products moving through the Tanzanian corridor, creating potential demand for storage, marine logistics, pipeline operations and other energy infrastructure clustered around the port, while increasing the strategic importance of its petroleum handling capacity more broadly. For Tanzania, the economic opportunity extends well beyond pipeline transit fees alone; the larger opportunity is cementing Dar es Salaam’s position as the primary energy logistics gateway for landlocked economies across the interior of East and Central Africa, a role this publication has covered separately in the context of Tanzania’s broader Central Corridor ambitions toward the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda. Could Zambia Actually Become a Regional Fuel Hub? That’s one of the explicit objectives Zambian officials have stated. With projected national consumption of 3.7 million tonnes by 2030 against a reported Tanzania pipeline capacity of roughly 7 million tonnes annually, Zambia could theoretically hold infrastructure capacity well exceeding its own domestic requirement, opening a genuine possibility for regional distribution. Zambia borders eight countries, giving it potential access to markets in the DRC, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola. But becoming a genuine regional fuel hub would require considerably more than pipeline capacity alone, storage infrastructure, cross-border logistics arrangements, competitive pricing, reliable supply contracts and sufficient demand in neighbouring markets would all need to develop alongside the pipeline itself. The infrastructure creates the capacity. The market still has to create the actual business case for using it at that scale. What’s the Real Milestone to Watch From Here? The most consequential development at this point isn’t the Cabinet approval itself, which has already happened, but whether Tanzania and Zambia can convert that approval into an actually bankable transaction and secure investors willing to finance and build two multi-billion-dollar pipelines simultaneously. Given that some version of this exact pipeline concept has been under discussion since at least 2001, the twenty-five years separating that original World Bank-documented proposal from this year’s Cabinet approval is itself a reasonable caution against assuming rapid progress from here. For Zambia, the pipelines represent fuel security built on evidence its own recent TAZAMA reform already validated. For Tanzania, they represent another step toward becoming the coast through which a considerably larger share of the African interior’s energy needs eventually move, provided both governments can turn a long-discussed idea into physical infrastructure this time. FAQ What exactly did Zambia’s Cabinet approve, and when? On 19 February 2026, Cabinet approved two public-private partnership pipeline projects: the Tanzania-Zambia Multi-Products Pipeline and the Namibia-Zambia Refined Petroleum and Natural Gas Pipeline, aimed at diversifying Zambia’s fuel supply sources. How is the new Tanzania pipeline different from the existing TAZAMA pipeline? TAZAMA, operational since 1968, currently carries mainly diesel. The new Tanzania-Zambia Multi-Products Pipeline would carry petrol, jet fuel and kerosene as well, addressing fuels Zambia currently has to import by road because the existing pipeline can’t handle them. What will the Namibia pipeline carry that makes it different from a standard fuel pipeline? Alongside refined petroleum products, it’s designed to carry up to 350 million cubic feet of natural gas daily, specifically intended for gas-to-power generation supporting Zambia’s copper mining industry, timed to align with Namibia’s own approaching offshore oil and gas production. Has Zambia already seen evidence that pipeline reform can lower fuel prices? Yes. A 2025 reform opening TAZAMA to competing oil marketing companies cut pipeline transportation premiums by more than 50% according to the IMF, and Zambian officials report it contributed to roughly a 33% reduction in retail diesel pump prices. Is construction underway on either new pipeline? No. As of September 2026, Zambia’s Ministry of Energy was still in the process of procuring a transaction adviser to help structure the deal, meaning both projects remain in a pre-construction planning and financing phase. Is this the first time a second Tanzania-Zambia pipeline has been proposed? No. A version of this idea appears in World Bank project documentation dating back to at least 2001, meaning some form of this pipeline concept has been under discussion for roughly 25 years before Cabinet’s 2026 approval.