Sudan at 187.6%, Senegal at 130.2%, Mozambique Above 100%: Africa’s Debt Outliers

Africa’s debt problem is not evenly distributed. The continental debt to GDP ratio may have eased from its recent peak, but several countries remain far outside the African norm. IMF data for 2025 place Sudan’s general government gross debt at 187.6% of GDP and Senegal’s at 130.2%, while the October 2026 debt map places Mozambique above 100%. These are not three versions of the same fiscal problem. Sudan’s ratio sits inside a war damaged economy whose GDP has collapsed. Senegal’s debt was dramatically revised upward after previously undisclosed liabilities were uncovered. Mozambique’s problem combines a heavy public debt burden with arrears, expensive domestic borrowing and an IMF assessment that overall public debt remains in distress. The ratios look similar because they are all exceptionally high. The economics behind them are very different. That difference matters because debt to GDP is often interpreted as if it were a direct measure of fiscal failure. It is not. The ratio can rise because debt increases, because GDP falls, because previously hidden liabilities are added to the official stock, because a currency depreciates against foreign debt, or because several of these forces occur at the same time. Sudan, Senegal and Mozambique show why Africa’s highest debt ratios have to be analysed through the history of how the debt was accumulated and the capacity of the economy to service it. The more useful question is therefore not simply which African country has the most debt. It is why the debt became so large, how much it costs to service, whether the government remains current on payments and whether the economy is producing enough revenue and foreign exchange to reduce the burden over time. Why Is Sudan’s Debt at 187.6% of GDP? Sudan’s 187.6% debt to GDP ratio is inseparable from the collapse of the economy during the conflict that began in April 2023. IMF fiscal data show that Sudan’s debt ratio had already reached extreme levels before the current war, peaking at 278.8% of GDP in 2020 and remaining above 260% in 2023 and 2024 before falling to 187.6% in 2025. The fall in the ratio should not be interpreted as a straightforward fiscal improvement. Sudan remains an economy operating under extraordinary institutional and humanitarian stress. The denominator is central to understanding the number. The World Bank estimates that Sudan’s real GDP contracted by 29.4% in 2023 and another 14% in 2024 as fighting destroyed infrastructure, disrupted services, displaced workers and damaged production. When national output collapses, an existing debt stock becomes much larger relative to the economy even if the government is not accumulating debt at the same pace. This makes Sudan’s debt ratio qualitatively different from that of a stable economy financing large infrastructure programmes. The country is attempting to carry debt against a tax base, export base and productive economy that have been severely damaged. More than 11.6 million people had been forcibly displaced by March 2026, while 21.2 million faced high levels of food insecurity, according to the World Bank. The fiscal question therefore cannot be separated from reconstruction, institutional recovery and the restoration of economic activity. Sudan shows how debt sustainability can deteriorate from the denominator side. A country does not need to double its nominal debt for the ratio to explode. If GDP, tax collection and foreign exchange earnings collapse, yesterday’s debt becomes harder to carry. Why Did Senegal’s Debt Jump to 130.2% of GDP? Senegal’s debt story is almost the opposite. The economy itself has not collapsed. Instead, the official debt picture changed dramatically after audits uncovered liabilities that had previously been excluded from reported public debt. In March 2025, the IMF said an audit by Senegal’s Court of Auditors had found that the average fiscal deficit between 2019 and 2023 had been understated by 5.6 percentage points of GDP and that central government debt at the end of 2023 had to be revised from 74.4% to 99.7% of GDP. The revision included previously undisclosed borrowing worth 25.3 percentage points of GDP. Further reconciliation pushed the number higher. By August 2025, the authorities had revised end 2023 central government debt to 111% of GDP and end 2024 debt to 118.8%. IMF regional analysis subsequently put Senegal’s broader debt at about 132% of GDP in 2024 and 130% in 2025. The distinction is crucial. Senegal did accumulate debt over time, but part of the recent jump in the published ratio came from discovering that the country had already borrowed more than previously reported. The fiscal deterioration was partly real and partly statistical recognition of an existing liability. This makes Senegal one of the most important African cases for debt transparency. A government can appear to have fiscal space if part of its borrowing sits outside the reported perimeter. Investors, citizens and even international institutions then make decisions using an incomplete balance sheet. The problem becomes more serious because hidden liabilities do not disappear simply because they were not disclosed. Interest continues to accrue, maturities still arrive and creditors still expect repayment. Senegal’s debt is therefore not only a borrowing problem. It is a public financial management problem. Is Senegal in Debt Distress? Senegal faces severe debt pressure, but the distinction between a high debt ratio and formal debt distress remains important. The IMF said in June 2026 that total public sector debt was estimated at around 132% of GDP at the end of 2024 while noting that the authorities had remained current on their debt obligations. The country’s financing problem has nevertheless become acute. Reuters reported in September 2026 that Senegal had about $44 billion in central government debt at the end of 2025 and that debt approached 130% of GDP once state owned enterprise and guaranteed liabilities were included. The government has been seeking a path towards renewed IMF support while facing arrears, high financing needs and a more difficult relationship with creditors following the hidden debt episode. Senegal is therefore an example of how a country can remain current on payments while its debt stock becomes increasingly difficult to refinance. Debt crises do not always begin with a missed coupon. They can emerge through rising yields, reduced market access, rollover pressure and a growing share of government revenue being committed to debt service. Why Is Mozambique Still Above the Debt Danger Line? Mozambique’s debt burden reflects a longer fiscal history marked by the hidden debt scandal, large external obligations, repeated shocks and a growing dependence on expensive domestic borrowing. The October 2026 debt graphic places general government debt above 100% of GDP, while the IMF’s 2025 Article IV debt sustainability analysis uses a somewhat different public debt perimeter and reported public sector debt of 91.5% of GDP in 2024. The difference illustrates why debt ratios should always be read alongside the underlying definition and coverage. What is unambiguous is the IMF’s assessment of risk. Its 2026 debt sustainability analysis classifies Mozambique as being in overall debt distress and says public debt is on an unsustainable path. External public debt is assessed at high risk of distress, while arrears had accumulated on both external and domestic obligations by the end of 2025. Mozambique’s fiscal pressure is increasingly shifting towards domestic debt. The IMF expects domestic borrowing to remain the principal source of government financing, with real interest rates projected to average about 9.3% over the next decade under its baseline assumptions. Domestic debt may reduce direct foreign currency exposure, but it can become extremely expensive and can absorb financial resources that might otherwise finance private investment. The government is now discussing reforms that could underpin a new IMF supported programme. In September 2026, IMF staff said Mozambique continued to face significant fiscal and external challenges and that further reforms were needed to restore debt sustainability. Can LNG Rescue Mozambique’s Debt Position? Mozambique’s large natural gas projects create a potential future source of foreign exchange and fiscal revenue, but expected resource income does not eliminate near term debt pressure. The IMF’s debt analysis assumes LNG revenues will eventually improve the external debt trajectory, with the present value of external debt expected to fall below its sustainability threshold only later in the projection period. The timing problem is familiar across resource economies. Governments incur liabilities before the commodity project reaches full production. Debt service arrives on a fixed schedule, while resource revenues depend on construction timelines, global prices, operating performance and contractual arrangements. LNG therefore improves Mozambique’s long term capacity to carry debt only if production, exports and fiscal receipts materialise strongly enough. It does not make current arrears or high domestic financing costs disappear. Mozambique’s experience is an important warning against borrowing heavily against future commodity income before that income becomes dependable. Why These Three Countries Cannot Be Read the Same Way The three ratios represent three different debt mechanisms. Sudan’s debt burden has been magnified by the destruction of the economy. Senegal’s ratio was transformed by the discovery and recognition of previously hidden liabilities. Mozambique has accumulated a large debt stock over years while experiencing financing constraints, arrears and weak debt dynamics. Country2025 debt to GDPMain source of pressureSudan187.6%War, economic contraction and a historically extreme debt stockSenegal130.2%Previously undisclosed liabilities, deficits and refinancing pressureMozambiqueAbove 100% in the October 2026 WEO graphicHigh debt, arrears, expensive domestic financing and weak fiscal capacityDebt sustainability therefore cannot be reduced to a continental threshold such as 60% or 70%. A 100% ratio in a stable high revenue economy is different from a 100% ratio in a low income economy with weak revenue collection, scarce foreign exchange and expensive financing. The ratio becomes dangerous when the government cannot generate enough fiscal and external resources to service the debt without repeatedly cutting productive expenditure, accumulating arrears or borrowing again simply to meet earlier obligations. Does a Falling Debt Ratio Mean the Problem Is Improving? Not necessarily. Sudan demonstrates the problem most clearly. Its ratio fell sharply from 262.6% in 2024 to 187.6% in 2025 in the IMF fiscal tables, but the country was still experiencing catastrophic economic and humanitarian conditions. Debt to GDP can decline through higher inflation, exchange rate movements, nominal GDP changes, restructuring, debt relief or stronger real economic growth. Those mechanisms have very different economic meanings. Senegal may eventually lower its ratio through strong hydrocarbon led growth, fiscal consolidation and active debt management. Mozambique may benefit from future LNG exports. Sudan could see a dramatic improvement if peace allows economic production to recover. But a falling ratio is meaningful only when it reflects genuine improvement in the state’s capacity to service debt rather than statistical movement in the denominator. The better indicators include interest payments as a share of revenue, debt service relative to exports, maturity profiles, arrears, foreign currency exposure and the government’s ability to borrow without paying punitive rates. What Do Africa’s Debt Outliers Say About the Wider Continent? The broader African debt story is less dramatic than these three cases but still important. The continental ratio shown in the October 2026 graphic fell from 62.1% of GDP in 2000 to just 26.6% in 2008 before climbing back to 65.1% in 2024 and easing to 62.9% in 2025. Africa therefore used much of the fiscal space created during the debt relief and high growth era that followed the early 2000s. Governments borrowed to finance infrastructure, respond to the pandemic, protect households during commodity shocks and cover persistent fiscal deficits. Currency depreciation also increased the local currency value of external debt in many countries, while rising global interest rates made refinancing more expensive. The continental average hides enormous variation. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo remain near 20% of GDP, while Sudan is close to ten times that level. Angola has reduced debt substantially from its pandemic peak, while South Africa’s ratio has more than doubled since 2000. Senegal’s position changed dramatically after debt was reclassified, showing that even apparently reliable historical series can shift when fiscal reporting improves. Africa therefore has a debt distribution problem as much as it has an average debt problem. Why Debt Transparency Is Becoming as Important as Debt Reduction Senegal makes the transparency issue impossible to ignore. Debt sustainability analysis is only as reliable as the balance sheet being analysed. If state owned enterprise liabilities, guarantees, bank loans, swaps or arrears are missing, the headline ratio can provide a false sense of security. The IMF says Senegal has since undertaken successive audits, centralised debt management functions and begun reforms aimed at strengthening data quality and budget controls. Similar questions apply across Africa because sovereign borrowing has become more complex. Governments increasingly use domestic bonds, Eurobonds, syndicated loans, guarantees, public corporations and other financing structures. A narrow central government debt number can therefore miss obligations that eventually become public liabilities. The quality of debt data is now part of debt sustainability itself. Markets charge more when they do not trust the numbers. Africa’s Debt Problem Is About Capacity, Not Just Borrowing The deeper issue behind Sudan, Senegal and Mozambique is the relationship between liabilities and productive capacity. Debt becomes easier to carry when borrowing finances an economy that subsequently produces more exports, taxes and output. It becomes harder when the economy stagnates, the borrowed money does not raise productivity, or shocks destroy the revenue base before the obligations mature. Sudan shows what happens when productive capacity collapses. Senegal shows what happens when the liability side of the balance sheet turns out to be larger than previously understood. Mozambique shows what happens when a country has future resource potential but current financing pressures remain severe. All three sit above levels that naturally attract attention, but the ratio alone is not the diagnosis. The real diagnosis begins by asking what produced the debt, what the debt produced in return and whether the economy can generate enough revenue and foreign exchange to service it. A debt ratio tells you how large the burden is. It does not tell you why the burden became heavy or whether the economy underneath it can carry it. FAQ Which African country has the highest debt to GDP ratio? Among the countries shown in the IMF based 2025 Africa debt comparison, Sudan has the highest ratio at 187.6% of GDP. IMF fiscal data confirm the same 2025 figure. Why is Sudan’s debt to GDP ratio so high? Sudan entered the current conflict with an already very high debt burden, while war has sharply reduced economic output. The World Bank estimates real GDP fell 29.4% in 2023 and another 14% in 2024. Why did Senegal’s debt rise above 130% of GDP? Audits uncovered previously undisclosed borrowing and wider fiscal deficits than had been officially reported. IMF regional analysis estimates Senegal’s debt at roughly 130% of GDP in 2025. Is Senegal restructuring its debt? Senegal has been discussing measures to address its debt burden and seeking a route towards renewed IMF support. As of late September 2026, Reuters reported that the authorities wanted rapid debt treatment but were avoiding characterising their approach as a restructuring. Is Mozambique in debt distress? Yes. The IMF and World Bank debt sustainability analysis classifies Mozambique as being in overall debt distress and says its public debt path is unsustainable under the baseline. Will Mozambique’s LNG projects reduce its debt burden? Future LNG exports are expected to improve Mozambique’s foreign exchange and fiscal position, but the IMF’s projections indicate that debt vulnerabilities persist for several years before anticipated LNG revenue materially improves the trajectory. Is debt above 100% of GDP automatically unsustainable? No. Debt sustainability depends on government revenue, interest rates, maturities, currency exposure, economic growth and access to financing. A debt ratio above 100% signals a heavy burden, but the capacity to service that burden differs significantly between countries.